CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORSHIP
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Jane K. Student
jkstudent@nova.edu
The Philosophy of Memory through Film
Prof. Steven Alford
Month 26, 20xx
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORSHIP
I certify that I am the author of this paper and that any assistance received in its preparation is fully acknowledged and disclosed in the paper. I have also cited any sources from which I used data, ideas, or words, either quoted directly or paraphrased. I also certify that I prepared this paper specifically for this section of this course.
___________________________________
Jane K. Student
Jane K. Student
Prof. Steven Alford
HONR 2000f
Month 26, 20xx
The Philosophy of Memory through Film
“…the mind has a power, in many cases, to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, - that it has had them before” (Locke 79).
The discussion of memory in philosophy often revolves around several topics of philosophical import: the self (particularly, theories of personal identity), the experience of time, and learning. In this research, the author explores the philosophy of memory by examining the work of classic and modern theorists and applying their ideas to the portrayal of memory in film. In Philosophy Through Film, Litch suggests:
A movie can be an effective tool for introducing a philosophical topic, because it allows
the viewer to drop many preconceived notions. We are all used to suspending our
commonsense views about how the world works in the context of fiction. This
suspension can be used to the philosopher’s advantage (2).
It is the author’s hope that, by abandoning expectation, an investigation of the nature of memory and its philosophical significance can be successfully realized.
Memory Defined
Sutton points out that the concept of memory involves “a great variety of phenomena” (“Memory”). By virtue, memory is a difficult concept to define – and philosophers have grappled with it for quite some time. In a lecture from The Analysis of Mind, Bertrand Russell warns: “This analysis of memory is probably extremely faulty, but I do not know how to improve it” (187). Indeed, memory is foreign to understanding even in the modern era – and yet, by examining numerous accounts of memory, one might logically expect to arrive nearer comprehension of this abstract faculty of the mind.
Aristotle was, perhaps, one of the earliest philosophers to venture a definition of memory. For Aristotle, memory was “neither Perception nor Conception, but a state or affection of one of these, conditioned by lapse of time” (On Memory and Reminiscence). Aristotle recognized that only perceptions could exist in the present. Likewise, only conceived notions could exist in the future. However, the act of remembering a perception or conception constituted a memory.
Locke later defined memory as “the storehouse of our ideas” (79). The act of remembering was, therefore, constituted by the revival of these ideas after some period of time spent hidden in the recesses of the mind. For Russell, memory was (provisionally) “that way of knowing about the past which has no analogue in our knowledge of the future” (165). Sutton more recently deemed memory simply, “a label for a diverse set of cognitive capacities by which humans and perhaps other animals retain information and reconstruct past experiences, usually for present purposes” (“Memory”).
It seems philosophers have been compelled, over the years, to distinguish between memory and imagination. Hume pointed out that impressions (or perceptions) are replayed within the mind as ideas (8). For Hume, memory was distinguished from imagination by two criteria: first, by the vivacity of the replayed idea (memory being more vivid), and second, by the extent to which the idea was malleable (memory being fixed and not subject to variation). Russell purported that although memory and imagination were both characterized by images, in memory, the images were accompanied by a conclusive feeling of belief that the image occurred (176). In general, the consensus seems to be that memory involves reality (or at least, actuality), while fantasy is typical of imagination.
Philosophers have similarly attempted to distinguish between types of memory, seemingly unsatisfied with a single, all-encompassing form of remembering. In an article composed for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sutton neatly outlines several of these distinctions. Sutton describes episodic memory (also referred to as recollective memory, personal memory, or direct memory) as memory of experiential events (“Memory”). For instance, a student remembers going to class yesterday morning (or at least, one hopes). Semantic memory (or propositional memory) is fact-based – that is, one remembers that Mahler composed ten symphonies. Procedural memory (also termed habit memory by Bergson and Russell) describes memory for “embodied skills” (Sutton) such as playing the piano or driving an automobile. This type of memory is responsible for learned association, an important phenomenon in the discussion of memory and learning to follow in this research.
Two other distinctions are still relatively controversial in the field of philosophy: that between declarative and nondeclarative memory, and that between explicit and implicit memory. Sutton describes declarative memory as a combination of semantic and episodic memories; therefore, this type of memory appears to aim at truthful representation of experiential events (“Memory”). By contrast, nondeclarative memory does not provide the same sense of truthfulness – that is, nondeclarative memory seemingly fails to represent the world or the past with candor. Some philosophers also differentiate between explicit and implicit memory; explicit memories being those consciously recognized (verbally or otherwise) by the individual, implicit memory being characterized by a lack of awareness (Sutton). Freud’s conceptualization of the unconscious mind and an individual’s tendency to repress memories (Friedman and Schustack 70) bears some relevance here: not only can a person retain memories without awareness (in the implicit memory), but these memories can (1) be reticent or forgotten (at least temporarily), and (2) can influence the individual’s future behavior. The existence of an implicit memory will prove particularly relevant in a later discussion of memory as an initiator of behavior.
Having completed this short exposition of the topic at hand, one is equipped to apply memory to more specific philosophical issues and dilemmas: the transitivity of identity, the experience of time, and learning.
An Overview of the Movies
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004)
Directed by Michel Gondry, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind stars Jim Carrey as Joel, a man who decides to have memories of his ex-girlfriend, Clementine (Kate Winslet), erased (after discovering she has already done so). The film chronicles the memory-removal procedure (performed at Joel’s house by technicians from Lacuna, Inc.) and eventually, Joel’s desperate attempts to keep just one memory of Clem intact.
Memento (2001)
After his wife’s death, Leonard Shelby (Guy Pearce) vows revenge and embarks on a journey to bring her murderer to justice. The only problem? Leonard suffers from anterograde amnesia – a dysfunction that has prevented him from creating new memories ever since his wife was murdered. Leonard deals with his condition by leaving mementos: tattoos, notes, and photographs. Nevertheless, he finds it nearly impossible to distinguish between friends and enemies – in the end, even the viewer is left wondering. Memento was directed by Christopher Nolan and also stars Carrie-Anne Moss and Joe Pantoliano.
Total Recall (1990)
In Paul Verhoeven’s film, Total Recall, Arnold Schwarzenegger stars as Quaid – a construction worker living on Earth. Quaid visits Rekall and buys a memory implantation of a trip to Mars. While at Rekall, Quaid comes to question his identity and the remainder of the movie forces the viewer to determine (or at least, attempt to) whether or not Quaid is real. The film also stars Rachel Ticotin and Sharon Stone.
Memory and the Persistence of Identity
Olson holds that one’s identity “consists roughly of those attributes that make you unique as an individual and different from others” (“Personal Identity”). Litch similarly concludes that
one’s personal identity implies who and what one is as an individual (67). But how might one reconcile an individual existing at present with another (assumedly identical) individual that existed in the past? One might ask: by virtue of what, exactly, am I today the same person that was born twenty-one years ago? Many philosophers argue that it is the persistence of identity over time that defines an individual as “the same thinking thing in different times and places” (Locke, qtd. in Ralston).
If there is some property (or group of characteristics) that relates one’s self at some past moment to one’s self at present (or some other moment), so that one identity is continuous over time, then identity must be transitive. A transitive relationship may be characterized by the following logical argument:
A relation, R, is said to be transitive if and only if the following is the case: if A is related
to B, by R and B is related to C, by R, then A is related to C, by R (Cole, “Self as
Psyche”).
If personal identity is to be continuous over time, the R in Cole’s equation must be accounted for. In many cases, philosophers have defined this variable by attributing it to memory, either wholly or in part. It seems the pivotal question in this discussion of memory and self is best framed by Sutton: “To what extent does memory construct and maintain the continuity of personal identity over time?” (“Memory: Philosophical Issues”).
Locke’s theory of personal identity (more recently termed the memory criterion) suggests that consciousness (particularly, the reflection of past perceptions and sensations – memory) is, in itself, the epitome of one’s identity (Ralston). Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2001) introduces a thought-provoking discussion of Locke’s construction of personal identity. Rejecting Locke’s theory, Hume posited that identity consisted of a series of perceptions, linked together or causally inferred (if forgotten) by memory (Ralston). Hume is best discussed, for current purposes, in association with Paul Verhoeven’s Total Recall (1990). The implication of Hume’s account is that there is more to personal identity than simply memory (as Locke had previously asserted). Freud may perhaps have agreed with Locke that memories were key in defining identity over time, but Freud’s conceptualization differs dramatically. Whereas Locke purported that consciously remembering produced identity, Freud believed identity resulted from unconscious memory as well:
Freud’s concept of identity holds that persons are only aware of fragmentary pieces of
memory selected by the Ego for reconstruction of an acceptable narrative and the
remainder is repressed, influencing identity without the person’s conscious awareness.
Under Freud’s theory, memory is episodic, rather than continuous, so that especially
powerful or traumatic experiences in our memories may be repressed but still influence
us on an unconscious level (Ralston).
The Michel Gondry film, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004), is highly useful in illustrating Freud’s attempt to account for the continuity of identity over time. Interestingly, all three films subject to examination herein seem to agree: memory is an important concept for formulating personal identity, but it is by no means the only method.
As previously mentioned, Locke derived identity as the process of reflecting on sensations and perceptions, and recognizing that the individual who first experienced the event is the same individual now remembering it. For Locke, personal identity and consciousness were necessarily related by memory. In accord, Ralston points out that “memory is much like a glue which binds personal identity to consciousness so that the one extends only so far as the other” (“The Necessity of Memory…”). So then, personal identity is only continuous to the extent that one remembers – consciously – episodic perceptions and sensations (or events).
What does this mean for Leonard Shelby in Memento? The memory criterion established by this line of reasoning is as such: two persons are identical if they share at least one experiential memory (Cole). Before the onset of anterograde amnesia, Leonard lived with his wife in San Francisco. After the onset of the disorder, Leonard remembers living with his wife in San Francisco. In this case, pre-amnesiac Leonard and post-amnesiac Leonard share at least one experiential memory. Therefore, Leonard’s identity is said to be continuous over time.
This assumption is clearly problematic. While Leonard is capable of recalling events in his long-term memory, his short-term memory is dysfunctional. Leonard now and Leonard five minutes ago do not share an experiential memory and can not be identical. It seems that, in order to preserve the continuity of Leonard’s identity, these experiences must be interpreted as another identity simply bearing physical resemblance to Leonard. Locke acknowledges this by making a distinction between “man” and “person” (Ralston). By this definition, Leonard is the same “man,” but a different “person” emerges every five minutes. It seems that for Leonard’s identity to persist over time (that is, for Leonard to be the same “man” and “person”), he must completely remember events stored in long-term and short-term memory.
The film suggests that this standard is unrealizable – perhaps even for those with functional memories: “Memory’s unreliable. Memory’s not perfect; it’s not even that good … Memory can change the shape of a room. It can change the color of a car – and memories can be distorted. They are just an interpretation, they are not a record” (Memento). Perhaps a less restrictive standard is more appropriate. Hume, acknowledging the fallibility of memory, extended personal identity beyond memory: where memory is incomplete, one might causally infer relationships between the remembered events so as to establish a persistent identity (Ralston). Ralston reiterates this “coherence concept of memory” as an individual’s ability to preserve continuity by relying on “a certain threshold of memories” (“The Necessity of Memory...”).
If Leonard’s long-term memory is sufficient as the memory-base proposed by Hume, perhaps Leonard’s fragmented short-term memory can be pieced together by other means to construct an identity that persists through time by virtue of combining the two. Leonard leaves himself mementos to coherently link perceptions: Leonard, in a sense, manually “remembers” by perceiving what has gone before (i.e. looking at a photograph) and then recognizing it has gone before by virtue of his current perception of it (i.e. the fact that the photograph exists necessarily implies that it was taken). This reconstruction of short-term memory thus provides a narrative that can be further linked to events stored in his long-term memory. Does Leonard, therefore, succeed in establishing a continuous identity in Hume’s fashion? Memento no doubt answers this question in the affirmative.
The problem with Hume’s theory is that inferred causal links are themselves fallible. As Ralston states: “…reconstructing a narrative around those events we recollect and imposing causative links leads to embellishment, or adding information to the truth, and therefore the generation of falsehoods” (“The Necessity of Memory…”). This dilemma is clearly depicted in Total Recall. If Quaid is the persistent identity (as the movie implies), one must account for his belief that he visited Mars. Hume would purport that Quaid’s belief in the implanted Mars experience is the result of inferring falsely while attempting to coherently link memories. Consider the following: Quaid visits Rekall and receives a memory implant that provides him with the experience of a trip to Mars. Following the implant, Quaid does not remember going to Rekall. However, Quaid has memories of visiting Mars and infers that the trip took place. He remembers the face of a sleazy (and demure) woman and infers that he met her on Mars. In this fashion, Quaid reconstructs the elements of the memory trip so that Quaid is the identity that persists over time.
Recall that for Russell, memories are accompanied by a distinct feeling of belief that what is remembered actually happened. St. Augustine identified a similar notion; that is, when an episode is perceived the episode spawns a “corresponding truth” (Ralston). Hume by no means denies the existence of some truth in conjunction with a perception (and eventually, a memory). For Hume, this truth is simply obscured by reconstruction (Ralston). Total Recall certainly implies that the corresponding truth related to Quaid’s memories of Mars (that is, Quaid’s trip to Rekall) exists. Nevertheless, this truth is buried in layers of reconstruction, allowing Quaid a continuous (albeit, very confused) identity.
Although Freud is more commonly associated with the field of psychology, his theory of psychoanalysis bears some relevance at this point in the discussion of memory and personal identity. Interestingly, Freud’s theory of personal identity had more to do with forgetting than remembering – so much so that Eagleton defined memory (for Freud) as “forgetting to forget” (qtd. in Ralston). According to Freud:
…persons are only aware of fragmentary pieces of memory selected by the Ego for
reconstruction of an acceptable narrative and the remainder is repressed, influencing
identity without the person’s conscious awareness. Under Freud’s theory, memory is
episodic, rather than continuous, so that especially powerful or traumatic experiences in
our memories may be repressed but still influence us on an unconscious level (Ralston).
One should note the parallel between Freud’s conceptualization and Hume’s account of personal identity: both rely on the reconstruction of narrative memory. However, for Hume the corresponding truth was masked in layers of reconstruction, whereas for Freud, the corresponding truth was intentionally repressed by the Ego.
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind seems particularly sympathetic to Freud’s theory: despite memory removal, the characters’ behavior suggests that the erased memories continue to influence their actions. Freud clearly makes a distinction between forms of memory: one type is conscious (explicit memory), the other is unconscious (implicit memory). Eternal Sunshine makes a similar distinction: when Joel visits Lacuna, Inc. he is asked to recount experiences with Clementine so that technicians can locate the memories to be erased. These memories must be explicit, by virtue of Joel’s ability to consciously recall them. What then, is left after the procedure? The movie contends that Joel is left with implicit memories that continue to influence his behavior, and thus, link post-operation Joel with pre-operation Joel.
Consider the evidence: Mary is compelled to seduce her boss at Lacuna despite having her memory of their previous affair erased. Clem and Joel, having forgotten their relationship with each other, nonetheless return to Montauk (where they first met). It seems that Eternal Sunshine purports that both implicit and explicit forms of memory define personal identity, but it is the implicit (not unlike the repressed) that accounts for the persistence of identity.
The consequence of this assertion is that one can have explicit or conscious memories erased without compromising the continuity of one’s identity. But suppose one’s implicit memories surfaced (or, as in Eternal Sunshine, one’s memory was restored); is a new identity now produced? The film purports that the recovered memories are integrated into the conscious memory without altering one’s personal identity: Clem and Joel remember their relationship, but still decide to start over (and the nature of their new relationship suggests nothing has changed). In Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, the unconscious, implicit memory clearly regulates the persistence of identity over time.
Before concluding this discussion of memory and self, one might return to the original query: how does memory (1) define identity, and (2) ensure the persistence of identity over time? Interestingly, all three films subject to examination herein seem to agree: memory is an important concept for formulating personal identity, but it is by no means the only method.
Memory is clearly an important concept for theories of personal identity, particularly in accounting for the continuity of identity over time. In some cases, a memory criterion may be sufficient for defining and maintaining personal identity. It is, perhaps, yet debatable to what extent memory can account for the transitivity of identity. However, an analysis of philosophy through film suggests that in many cases something more is required. If these three films agree on no other aspect, at least one point may be forwarded: memory, while a significant factor, is not the only way to account for the transitivity of identity.
Memory and the Experience of Time
As Aristotle implied, all memories involve a sense of having gone before: “All memory, therefore, implies a time elapsed; consequently only those animals which perceive time remember, and the organ whereby they perceive time is also that whereby they remember” (On Memory and Reminiscence). Russell terms this sense a “feeling of pastness” (162). Memory seems inextricably linked with temporal experience. Time is a perception in which a present sensation is judged by virtue of comparison with another, similar, remembered sensation: “The person formulates the perception of ‘time’ by comparing the moment in which he lives with what he has in his memory. If this comparison is not made, neither can there be perception of time” (IslamiCity).
In Memento, Leonard asserts that he is unable to feel the passage of time. Why? Le Poidevin points out that “although we perceive the past, we do not perceive it as past, but as present” (“The Experience and Perception of Time”). It seems, therefore, that it is the conversion of present sensation to past sensation (that is, one that can be remembered as having occurred) that constitutes this feeling that time passes. Leonard perceives the present (at least, in five minute intervals or so), but his condition prevents him from forming memories of the sensations. Leonard is unable to recall a sensation and recognize it as occurring in the past. Therefore, he can experience time as discontinuous moments, but he can not experience time as passing.
Hoerl asserts that sensing the passage of time creates the feeling of finality associated with action:
We are thus “sensitive to the irrevocability of certain acts,” [Hoerl, qtd. in Sutton] so that
we, unlike other animals and (perhaps) some severely amnesic patients, incorporate a
sense of the uniqueness and potential significance of particular choices and actions into
our plans and our conceptions of how to live (Sutton, “Memory”).
An action once performed can not be taken back (although the memory of the action may be repressed, forgotten, or one day even removed). In Memento, the viewer learns that Leonard has embarked on a killing spree to avenge his wife’s brutal death. Perhaps it is his inexperience of time (in addition to his condition) that prevents him from recognizing the finality of his acts – and thus, refraining from them.
Perhaps feeling the passage of time is not as important as one might suppose. After all, it was only in its absence that Leonard lamented his inexperience of it. Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind suggests that the loss of this type of temporal experience is perplexing or even distressing. The head technician at Lacuna admits that the memory-removal procedure is virtually brain damage. Accordingly, those who have had the procedure emerge from the operation in a bit of a daze. Suddenly, there are unexplained phenomena that clearly occurred, but the individual has no means of linking the past event to the instance of perception. Joel observes a dent in his car, but can not determine its origin. He later notes that pages he does not remember writing are missing from his journal. It seems, at least, that an extreme sense of disorientation results from the inability to construct temporal relationships.
Interestingly, it seems both films were intended to be disorienting for the viewer – perhaps to highlight the problematic nature of coherently passing through time, absent memories. The two films present events both chronologically and backwards: the viewer is forced to piece discontinuous moments together to experience time as passing (which finally provides a sense of understanding).
It seems that this discussion of memory and time has led to several conclusions after analyzing the two films, Memento and Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind. For one, memory is an integral faculty for experiencing time and establishing coherent temporal relationships. Moreover, it seems that the ability to conceive of the present as finite and unchangeable may determine one’s behavior to some extent. Finally, the loss of one’s sense of passing through time is very disorienting, if not also distressing for the individual.
Memory and Learning
For Descartes, a memory could, by association with a perception, influence and shape future reactions to like stimuli. One might describe this relationship as one in which a response is learned by virtue of remembering. Descartes pointed out (in correspondence), that
… what makes some people want to dance may make others want to cry … because it
evokes ideas in our memory: for instance those who have in the past enjoyed dancing to a
certain tune feel a fresh wish to dance the moment they hear a similar one; on the other
hand, if someone had never heard a galliard without some affliction befalling him, he
would certainly grow sad when he heard it again (20).
Sutton suggests that Descartes’ example poses two possibilities about the nature of this memory-perception relationship: either (1) an individual is unaware of such a connection and reacts without understanding what prompted the response, or (2) an individual is aware of the memories that evoked the response. In the second case, Sutton further supposes that the individual could not only describe the memories, but might also endeavor to benefit from the realization (perhaps by working through the evoked response). Sutton’s discussion seems to imply (as does Descartes’) that an individual might learn by compiling memories and analyzing the responses they produce.
It is interesting to note that some philosophers have tended not to acknowledge this notion of learned association, à la Descartes and Sutton, as a genuine form of memory. In The Analysis of Mind, Russell reiterated Bergson’s distinction between habit and recollection – habit being a form of learned association, recollection being recall of unique events (166). Russell acknowledged the existence of both, but contended that recollection was the only true form of memory (166). However, even such assertions seem to beg the question – certainly, a learned response is no longer a type of memory, but a form of knowledge that stems from a collection of memories. In this respect, the matter at hand appears worth further consideration.
compiling memories and analyzing the responses they produce.
Recall the author’s earlier discussion of memory and self as it is depicted in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind: the characters were purportedly influenced by implicit memories deep within the unconscious. However, these memories were made explicit when Clem and Joel received videotapes detailing the memories each had consciously forgotten. Might the pair now use hindsight to their advantage (as Sutton suggests)? While Sutton’s concept is plausible, the film suggests that Clem and Joel will not learn from these past experiences: the two decide, once again, to engage in a relationship – and (as noted earlier) no changes are evident. Furthermore, Chattaway points out that the final scene of the film depicts two people running on a beach, looped three times before fading (“Forget Me Not”). Indeed, Eternal Sunshine purports that individuals, provided the chance to “begin again” will make “the same mistakes over and over, instead of learning from them and moving on” (Chattaway).
Conclusion
This discussion of memory focused on three philosophical issues, in particular: the self and persistence of identity over time, temporal experiences and relationships, and learning. By applying conceptualizations of memory to each of three films (Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, Memento, and Total Recall), one arrives at the following determination: the philosophy of memory is an expansive topic only partially considered in this research. Sutton states that “Although an understanding of memory is likely to be important in making sense of the continuity of the self … and of our experience of time, it has been curiously neglected by many philosophers” (“Memory”). Hopefully, the topics discussed herein will generate increased interest throughout the field of philosophy and this mere exposition of the philosophy of memory through film might one day be expanded immensely.
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